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 GREASY LUCK TO WHALERS 
How the International Whaling Commission and International Court of Justice can use principles 
of American administrative and environmental law to keep Japan from circumventing the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
CHRISTINA CAREY MCCLINTOCK 
Abstract: The International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling allows whaling to be conducted 
for the purposes of scientific research. Japan has 
manipulated this exception and conducted commercial 
whaling under the guise of the scientific research 
exception. This paper examines how the International 
Whaling Commission and International Court of Justice 
could use insights from administrative and 
environmental law to improve and tighten regulation of 
scientific whaling programs in order to ensure that such 
programs do not frustrate the purposes of the 
Convention. 
  
Death to the living,  
Long life to the killers,  
Success to sailors’ wives  
And greasy luck to whalers. 
 
A Traditional Nantucket Drinking Toast1 
 
The whaling capital of the world in the “late 18th and early 19th centuries,”2 Nantucket 
was in many ways a town ahead of its time. Heavily influenced by Quaker roots,3 Nantucket 
welcomed religious diversity4 and was home to a robust abolitionist movement.5 It embraced 
gender equality: its de facto town leader was a woman, Mary Coffin Starbuck, and “[i]t was said 
that nothing of consequence was done on Nantucket without Mary’s approval.”6 Moreover, 
Nantucketers lived and worked in harmony at a level achieved by few other societies in history.7  
This progressive island decimated its local whaling population by the late eighteenth 
century8 yet felt no qualms doing so:  “Nantucketers saw no contradiction between their 
livelihood and their religion. God Himself had granted them dominion over the fishes of the 
sea.”9 The world has a different view of whaling today. Yet anyone looking for signs of guilt 
over Nantucket’s role in the decline of whaling populations would be sorely disappointed. A 
                                                 
1 Nathaniel Philbrick, In the Heart of the Sea 9 (2000). 
2 Nathaniel Philbrick, “How Nantucket Came to Be the Whaling Capital of the World.” Smithsonian 
Magazine (Dec. 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/nantucket-came-to-be-whaling-capital-
of-world-180957198/.  
3 Philbrick, supra note 1, at 6. 
4 Id. 
5 “The Abolitionist Movement: The Atheneum Celebrates Nantucket’s Anti-Slavery Movement and Local 
Abolitionists” The Nantucket Atheneum https://www.nantucketatheneum.org/about/testhistory/nantucket-
the-abolitionist-movement/ (last visited (accessed 4/30/2017). 
6 Philbrick, supra note 1, at 5. 
7 Clifford W Ashley. The Yankee Whaler 99 (1938) (“There is no finer example in history of communal 
enterprise than the Nantucket Whale Fishery. The inhabitants were uniquely situated for united effort .... 
Through intermarriage they were generally related to one another, and in fact were more like a large 
family than a civic community .... The people were so law-abiding that there was little or no government 
in evidence on the Island.”) Cited in Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: 
Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 83, 86 (1989). 
8 Philbrick, supra note 1, at 4 
9Id. at 6. 
local museum celebrates Nantucket’s past as a whaling juggernaut,10 as does one of the most 
popular local beers.11 
In the height of Nantucket’s whaling prowess, courts would defer to the customs of 
whalers.12 Like most of the world, courts take a different view of whalers these days. In 
Australia v. Japan, the International Court of Justice declined to defer to the national government 
of Japan even when Japan, at least in the views of one judge, demonstrated “formal compliance” 
with the law.13 Admittedly, the nature of the trust here is somewhat different: the US cases dealt 
with competing claims to possession of a single whale, whereas Australia v Japan assessed the 
validity of permits to kill whales en masse.  
It may seem hard to reconcile the celebration of Nantucket’s whaling history with the 
moral outrage that accompanies Japan’s modern efforts at maintaining whaling. Japan has its 
own rich tradition of whaling, one that extends even further back in time – back to before the 
sixteenth century.14 And whaling in the United States ended because it ceased to be a profitable 
industry,15 not because the country had a change of heart.  
In the height of the whaling era, however, no one harbored any illusions about what 
whalers were trying to accomplish: whalers “might ‘act the Quaker,’ but that didn’t keep them 
from pursuing profits with a lethal enthusiasm.”16 Japan, by contrast, has been circumventing 
                                                 
10 https://www.nha.org/sites/.  
11 http://ciscobrewers.com/beer/whales-tale-pale-ale.  
12 Ghen v. Rich, 8 Fed. 159 (D. Mass. 1881); Swift v. Gifford, 23 Fed. Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 
13,696). See generally Ellickson, supra note 7. 
13 Australia v. Japan [2014], Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (International Court of Justice). 
14 Junichi Takahashi, “Japanese Whaling Culture: Continuities and Diversities,” available at 
http://www.marecentre.nl/mast/documents/Japanesewhalingculture.pdf. (note -- unable to find additional 
publication information). 
15 Derek Thompson, “The Spectacular Rise and Fall of U.S. Whaling: An Innovation Story,” THE 
ATLANTIC, (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/the-spectacular-rise-
and-fall-of-us-whaling-an-innovation-story/253355/.  
16 Philbrick supra note 1, at 13. 
international whaling law while claiming to follow it. Frustration with this lack of honesty 
seemed to be driving the International Court of Justice in a 2014 decision invalidating Japan’s 
whaling program. Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice reached this conclusion 
through an overly fact-heavy analysis that did not ask two seemingly fundamental questions: (1) 
did Japan articulate a purpose for research that was consistent with the goals of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and (2) did Japan set a target for whale killings that 
would not undermine the purposes of the Convention? This paper first explores the shortcomings 
of the International Court of Justice’s decision. Next it will look at areas of American 
administrative and environmental law to indicate how the International Court of Justice’s 
reasoning could be improved. 
Background 
History of International Whaling Law 
In the mid-20th century, the world began to take notice of whale species’ declining 
populations. First was the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which prohibited the 
killing of certain categories of whales and required whaling operations by vessels of States 
parties to be licensed, but it failed to address the increase in overall catch levels.”17 Next was the 
1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, which “provided for the issuance 
by a ‘Contracting Government . . . to any of its nationals [of] a special permit authorizing that 
national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research.’”18 While the 1937 
Agreement may have allowed these kinds of permits, its enactment marked a shift toward an 
                                                 
17 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 245 (International Court of Justice).  
18 Id., citing 1937 International Agreement. 
international regime focused on “safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources 
represented by the whale stocks”19 rather than a sole focus on “industrial profitability.”20 
The governing documents are the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling, signed on December 2, 1946,21 which established the International Whaling 
Commission,22 and its “legally binding Schedule which, among other things, sets out catch limits 
for commercial and aboriginal subsistence whaling.”23 The Schedule may be amended, but any 
state (or “Contracting Government”) can avoid being subjected to the amendment if it objects.24 
Commercial whaling has been banned since 1986, with Japan assenting to the ban in 1987 after 
initially objecting.25 
The Convention allows whaling to be conducted when it is “for purposes of scientific 
research,”26 and the Schedule provides “scientific permits” to be issued, subject to review by the 
Scientific Committee.27 The Scientific Committee of the International Whaling Commission, 
established in 1950, “reviews and comments on special permits before they are issued by States 
parties to their nationals for purposes of scientific research under Article VIII, paragraph 1, of 
                                                 
19 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/whaling.asp; see also https://iwc.int/convention.  
20 Australia Memorial, 16, Australia v. Japan (May 9, 2011) (International Court of Justice), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/17382.pdf.  
21 Id. 
22 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Article III (1), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/whaling.asp; see also https://iwc.int/convention.  
23 https://iwc.int/convention.  
24 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Article V (3), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/whaling.asp.  
25 Samuel K. Rebmann, “Japanese Whaling and the International Community: Enforcing the International 
Court of Justice and Halting NEWREP-A,” 2, available at 
https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/azjis/article/download/19421/19057.   
26 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Article VIII, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/whaling.asp.  
27 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946, Schedule paragraph 30, as amended by 
the Commission at the 66th Meeting, Portorož, Slovenia, October 2016, 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3606&k=.  
the Convention.”28 Starting in the middle of the 1980s, “the Scientific Committee has conducted 
its review of special permits on the basis of “Guidelines” issued or endorsed by the 
Commission.”29 The current set of Guidelines, for example, requires that the objectives of the 
research must include the following broad objectives: “(i) improve the conservation and 
management of whale stocks, (ii) improve the conservation and management of other living 
marine resources or the ecosystem of which the whale stocks are an integral part and/or, (iii) test 
hypotheses not directly related to the management of living marine resources.” 30 While these 
Guidelines offer insight to both the Scientific Committee, and, by extension, the International 
Whaling Commission, the Scientific Committee’s application of them to special permits does not 
have binding legal force.31 
Japan’s Attitude toward whaling, JARPA II, and the International Court of Justice Ruling 
Japan has been historically antagonistic toward restrictions on whaling; it voted against 
“the imposition of the moratorium when it was adopted at the IWC’s Thirty‑Fourth Annual 
Meeting on 23 July 1982” and “subsequently lodge[d] a formal objection to the amendment 
when it did so on 4 November 1982.”32 Japan argued that “the purpose of the Convention was to 
promote and maintain whale fishery stocks, not to ban whaling completely.”33 Because the 
Convention allows for states to use formal objections to avoid being bound to Schedule 
                                                 
28 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 247 (International Court of Justice). 
29 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 248-249 (International Court of Justice).  
30 Annex P: Process for the Review of Special Permit Proposals and Research Results from Existing and 
Completed Permits 1. (1)(d)(i),(ii),(iii). When JARPA II, the program at issue in Australia v. Japan, was 
“proposed in 2005, the applicable Guidelines had been collected” in Annex Y, a precursor to Annex P. 
Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 27 (International Court of Justice). 
31 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 248 (International Court of Justice). 
32 Australia v. Japan [2014], Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, 445. 
33 U.S. Sanctions against Japan for Whaling, 95 AMERICAN J. INT’L L 149, 150 (2001). 
Amendments,34 Japan was originally exempted from the moratorium.35 It agreed to cease 
commercial whaling only after the United States “threatened in 1984 to certify Japan under the 
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.”36 Such certifications would have allowed the 
United States to “prohibit the importation into the United States of fish products of the offending 
country”37 and to reduce “the actual or proposed allocation of fishing privileges in U.S. waters 
under the Magnuson Act.”38  
Japan’s scientific whaling program began immediately after it ceased its commercial 
whaling program.39 Japan has now conducted three such programs. The first, entitled “The 
Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic”, or “JARPA,”40 
occurred from the 1987-1988 through the 2004-2005 season.41 It was replaced immediately by 
JARPA II.42 JARPA existed for the stated purpose of “collecting scientific data to contribute to 
the review and comprehensive assessment of the moratorium on commercial whaling, as 
                                                 
34 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Article III (1), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/whaling.asp; see also https://iwc.int/convention. 
35 Samuel K. Rebmann, “Japanese Whaling and the International Community: Enforcing the International 
Court of Justice and Halting NEWREP-A,” 66, available at 
https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/azjis/article/download/19421/19057. 
36 U.S. Sanctions against Japan for Whaling, 95 AMERICAN J. INT’L L 149, 150 (Jan., 2001). 
Interestingly, Iceland and Norway have continued to whale because they have chosen not to subject 
themselves to the moratorium. Australia Memorial, 35, Australia v. Japan, (May 9, 2011) (International 
Court of Justice), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/17382.pdf.  
37  Gene S. Martin, Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 293, 295 
(1988-1989) (internal citation omitted). 
38 Id. at 297 (internal citation omitted). 
39 Samuel K. Rebmann, “Japanese Whaling and the International Community: Enforcing the International 
Court of Justice and Halting NEWREP-A,” 66, available at 
https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/azjis/article/download/19421/19057. 
40 Government of Japan, Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under 
Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) - Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of 
New Management Objectives for Whale Resources, 1. http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/SC57O1.pdf.  
41 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 261 (International Court of Justice). 
42 Id. 
envisaged by paragraph 10 (e)  of the Schedule.”43 Although “[m]ore than 6,700 Antarctic minke 
whales were killed over the course of JARPA’s 18‑year history,”44 the International Court of 
Justice (Court) did not call JARPA’s legality into question when it analyzed JARPA II.45 
The Court’s framework can be described quite cleanly, but the inquiry it entails is very 
messy. The Court first asks if a program “involves scientific research” and then goes on to see if 
“the killing, taking and treating of whales” is done “for purposes of’ scientific research.”46 In 
evaluating this second question, it asks “whether the design and implementation of a programme 
are reasonable in relation to achieving the stated research objectives.”47 
While the Court noted on multiple occasions that JARPA and JARPA II had 
“considerable overlap” and were more similar than different,48 the court decided that the “far 
more extensive” use of lethal methods rendered JARPA II a breach of the Convention where 
JARPA was acceptable.49 The Court was insufficiently convinced by Japan’s explanations for its 
use of lethal methods and further found that it gave “little attention” to “the possibility of using 
non‑lethal research methods.”50 The Court also looked at the scale and sample sizes of the 
program. It determined that the “significant gap between the JARPA II target sample sizes and 
the actual number of whales that have been killed”51 supported Australia’s contention that the 
                                                 
43 Id. (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
44 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 262 (International Court of Justice). 
45 Id. at 260. 
46 Id. at 255; citing International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Article VIII, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/whaling.asp. Matt DiCenso, Trouble on the High Seas: A Need 
for Change in the Wake of Australia v. Japan, 39 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 13, 19 (2016). 
47 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 260 (International Court of Justice).  
48 Id. at 273. 
49 Id. at 292. The Court cited expanded use of lethal methods for minke whales as well as the introduction 
of lethal methods for two other types of whales. 
50 Id. at 293. 
51 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 286 (International Court of Justice). 
targets were made for reasons unrelated to scientific research.52 In fact, the number of whales 
killed in JARPA II was significantly lower than the research proposal,53 suggesting that were 
Japan to have killed more whales, its plan might have been less legally suspect. 
Argument 
Although the Court reached a disposition that conservationists might celebrate, its 
analysis is unsatisfying. The most jarring flaw is the lack of clarity surrounding the world 
“scientific research,” an issue the Court itself acknowledges.54 Moreover, the Court’s analysis of 
a program’s purpose insufficiently promotes the Conventions objectives in two important ways. 
On the one hand, by treating scientific research as a purpose in itself and not inquiring into the 
purposes of the research, the Court allows for research programs that are directly antithetical to 
the goals of the Convention. On the other hand, once the Court finds that the actions are done for 
an acceptable purpose, the purpose is too great of a shield. As Judge Cançado Trindade flags in 
his Separate Opinion, the opinion leaves open the possibility that identical programs could be 
either acceptable or unacceptable depending on whether they are framed as scientific research 
programs or whale meat supply programs. 55 
This paper will first look at the implications of the International Court of Justice decision. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice dictates that “[t]he decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case,”56 and thus the 
result in this the case does not dictate a result in a particular case. One can imagine, however, 
that the Judges of the International Court of Justice will approach a future case with the same 
                                                 
52 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 290 (International Court of Justice). 
53 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 286 (International Court of Justice). 
54 Id. at 255. 
55 Australia v. Japan [2014], Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 356 (International Court of 
Justice). 
56 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 59. 
type of analysis it used in this case. The time for such analysis may come soon: six months after 
the Court ruled in Australia v Japan, Japan announced a new scientific whaling program.57 This 
program will be even more detrimental than JARPA II: it calls “for 333 minke whales to be 
taken annually (not including animals struck and lost), which represents an increase from the 252 
whales taken in the last year of JARPA II.”58 It would be unfortunate if Japan were able to 
“retro-fit,” to use Australia’s terms,59 its research program so as to circumvent the formal 
requirements of the law while its behavior frustrates the purposes of the Convention. 
Next, this paper will analyze how features of American Administrative Law and 
Environmental Law could help the International Whaling Commission and International Court of 
Justice take a better approach, one that is more consistent with their goals of conservation. In 
addition to inadequately assessing the purposes behind scientific research programs, the 
International Court of Justice also inadequately assessed the implications of the programs. While 
it got to the right result in this case, it leaves the door open for more detrimental programs in the 
future. 
The Purposes of Scientific Research 
That the International Court of Justice declined to scrutinize the legality of the first 
JARPA program widens the door for tightly written commercial whaling programs to become 
legal. First, the purpose of JARPA, as stated above, was “collecting scientific data to contribute 
to the review and comprehensive assessment of the moratorium on commercial whaling, as 
envisaged by paragraph 10 (e)  of the Schedule.”60 In other words, immediately after Japan 
                                                 
57 “Japan’s ‘New’ Proposal for Continued Research Whaling in the Antarctic Ocean,” Greenpeace, 
International Foundation for Animal Welfare, and World Wildlife Foundation (Dec. 15, 2014) 
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/2015-Greenpeace-IFAW-WWF-JARPA-III-Briefing.pdf. 
58 Id. 
59 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 275 (International Court of Justice). 
60 Id. at 261. 
finally acceded to the the commercial whaling moratorium of the schedule, it began a program 
with the exact goal of fighting against the moratorium. The International Whaling Commission 
and United States both saw this effort for what it was and responded accordingly: President 
Reagan “strip[ped] Japan of all its fishing rights in U.S. waters pursuant to the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment,” among other efforts, 61 whereas the IWC “strongly urg[ed]” Japan to 
desist.62 Yet the International Court of Justice never expressly disavows this purpose. Judge 
Cançado Trindade spoke to this issue in his separate opinion, noting that the Agreement as a 
whole “evidences” a goal of “conservation” and that the agreement “would have been structured 
differently” if it were intended to protect the whaling industry.63 
The Court’s comparisons between JARPA and JARPA II render international whaling 
law easy to manipulate. The International Court of Justice should have simply invalidated the 
program once Japan volunteered that the long-term goal of JARPA II was to reinstate 
commercial whaling. When the Japanese Government wrote up its JARPA II plan, it volunteered 
that the original JARPA program was undertaken to “pave the way for the resumption of 
sustainable whaling.”64 Japan goes on to explain that it moved from JARPA to JARPA II 
because the results of its research indicated a need for further research.65 Japan does not list 
                                                 
61 U.S. Sanctions against Japan for Whaling, 95 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 149, 151 (Jan., 2001) citing 12 
Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate Reporting on 
Japanese Whaling Activities, 1 PUB. PAPERs 424 (1988).  
62 U.S. Sanctions against Japan for Whaling, 95 AMERICAN J. INT’L L 149, 151 (Jan., 2001) quoting 
Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in the North Pacific Ocean, IWC Res. 2000-5 (2000), 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/sciperms.htm.  
63 Australia v. Japan [2014], Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 349 (International Court of 
Justice). 
64 Government of Japan, Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under 
Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) - Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of 
New Management Objectives for Whale Resources, 5. http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/SC57O1.pdf.  
65 Id. (“The meeting also agreed that the results obtained provide clear support for the need to take 
species-interaction (ecosystem) effects into account in understanding the dynamics of the baleen whale 
species in the Antarctic ecosystem, and predicting future trends in their abundance and population 
structure.”) 
resuming sustainable whaling as one of its goals,66 but it does list as a goal the “sustainable use 
of these resources,”67 which is essentially the same thing. Japan does nothing to correct the 
conclusion that it is seeking to continue whaling – at no point does it disavow the purposes of 
JARPA. That Japan describes the research methods as “basically the same as the previous 
JARPA”68 and incorporates the selling of whale meat into its plan69 would seem to be the icing 
on the cake. The International Court of Justice, therefore, did not need to write a 153-page 
opinion. Japan has admitted – or at least has not denied – that the purposes of its “research” is 
commercial, and that should be sufficient to invalidate it on its purpose. 
In addition to insufficiently scrutinizing the purposes of the research program, the 
International Court of Justice also does not go far enough in ensuring that the end results of the 
research program do not frustrate the purposes of the Convention. Instead, the International 
Court of Justice seemed primarily focused on searching JARPA II for signs of deception. This is 
a dangerous approach because it means that Japan can wreak further havoc on whale populations 
in JARPA III provided that it is sufficiently clear and precise about what it intends to do. 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1 (listing the goals as “1) Monitoring of the Antarctic ecosystem, 2) Modelling competition 
among whale species and developing future management objectives, 3) Elucidation of temporal and 
spatial changes in stock structure and 4) Improving the management procedure for the Antarctic minke 
whale stocks.”). 
67 Government of Japan, Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under 
Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) - Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of 
New Management Objectives for Whale Resources, 6. http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/SC57O1.pdf. 
68 Id. at 5. 
69  Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 259 (International Court of Justice). The International 
Court of Justice spends remarkably little time on this issue, noting in passing that “the fact that a 
programme involves the sale of whale meat and the use of proceeds to fund research is not sufficient, 
taken alone, to cause a special permit to fall outside Article VIII.” Id. Perhaps the Court did not go into 
greater detail on the use of whale meat because it could use other reasons to find that JARPA II was a 
commercial whaling program. It was, however, surprising that the International Court of Justice spent so 
little time on the sale of whale meal, given that Japan has, at times, defended its interest in commercial 
whaling on the grounds that eating whale meat is an important part of Japanese. See, e.g., Tetsuji Ida, 
“Researcher aims to bust myth of Japan’s ‘whale-eating’ culture.” THE JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/14/national/researcher-aims-to-bust-myth-of-japans-whale-
eating-culture/#.WQUhu2Xw-uU; Paul Watson, “The Truth about ‘Traditional’ Japanese Whaling.” Sea 
Shephard (Jun. 27, 2006), http://www.seashepherd.fr/news-and-media/editorial-060627-1.html.  
Relevant Principles of American Administrative Law and Environmental Law  
Conservationists working in the United States have faced similar issues to those trying to 
protect whales abroad. Just as the International Court of Justice’s reasoning in Australia v. Japan 
allows states to kill large numbers of whales as long as they cleverly and meticulously explain 
what they are doing, so too does the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)70 allow for 
government agencies to destroy the environment so long as they do not make any procedural 
missteps. As a result, environmental challenges have been largely ineffective: “The US Supreme 
Court, going back to the Rehnquist court, has been particularly unfriendly to cases brought under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), ruling against the environmentalists in 15 
straight cases.”71  
 The root of the ineffectiveness of NEPA challenges is the the Supreme Court’s 
determination that NEPA is a “procedural” statute72 and “does not mandate particular results, but 
simply prescribes necessary process.”73 In other words, while NEPA requires government 
agencies to disclose the damage they will do to the environment,74 it allows the agencies to 
disregard entirely the consequences after they have listed them out.  
 This deference is rooted in the U.S. law assumption that agencies have greater technical 
expertise and that courts should not “substitute its own” judgment for the agencies.75 NEPA is no 
                                                 
70 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. 
71 Joshua Horwitz, War of the Whales 284 (2014). 
72 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980). 
73 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); See also Strycker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-228, 100 S.Ct. 497, 499-500, 62 L.Ed.2d 433 
(1980) (per curiam); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1219, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). 
74 See generally Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineer, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir 1983) 
(wherein the Court says that an Environmental Impact Statement was not sufficient because it contained 
substantial factual inaccuracies).  
75 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Chevron 
gives agencies broad discretion. For another doctrine illustrating broad agency deference, see Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
exception.76 This trust is often misplaced. While the Supreme Court of the United States assumes 
that analyzing the environmental impacts of a project77 is “almost certain to affect the agency's 
substantive decision,”78 the agency conducting the project is given no incentive to alter its goals 
in light of environmental considerations. The District of Columbia Circuit has even allowed 
agencies to stop short of collecting all information where the agency deems that it has collected 
“enough” information.79 This decision was especially unsatisfying in light of the fact that another 
agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, had been “especially critical” of aspects of the 
program.80  
Still, one can understand United States courts’ hesitancy to second guess agencies. 
Judges, by and large, lack the technical expertise of agency officials. And agencies are more 
affiliated with the democratically elected branches.   
The International Court of Justice has no such need for hesitancy. While United States 
courts are essentially forced to choose between their judgment and the agencies (and, of course, 
the parties litigating against the agencies), the International Court of Justice can take a middle 
ground. It should give great deference to the findings of the Scientific Committee. For that to 
happen, however, the Scientific Committee would need to be empowered to make determinations 
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79 State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“NEPA simply does not specify the 
quantum of information that must be in the hands of a decisionmaker before that decisionmaker may 
decide to proceed with a given project. Rather, NEPA was intended to ensure that decisions about federal 
actions would be made only after responsible decisionmakers had fully adverted to the environmental 
consequences of the actions, and had decided that the public benefits flowing from the actions outweighed 
their environmental costs.”) 
80 Id. at 468. 
about proposed research programs and would need to have those research programs carry weight. 
But such a system, were it to exist, would seem to satisfy even the concerns of dissenters. For 
example, Judge Yusef, in dissent, took issue with the International Court of Justice’s inquiry into 
the reasonableness of the lethal sampling.81 Judge Yusef was concerned that inquiries into 
sample size and scale were “matters on which scientists and the statistical calculations they use 
for that purpose can differ” and were not matters for the International Court of Justice to second-
guess.82 This debate was framed by the Whale and Dolphin Conservation as a question of “who 
gets to decide what constitutes science.”83 The Scientific Committee is a logical candidate. 
Unfortunately, both the International Court of Justice nor the International Whaling 
Commission seem to be unnecessarily hesitant to empower the Scientific Committee. First, 
although the International Court of Justice mentions in passing that “[t]he research objectives 
come within the research categories identified by the Scientific Committee in Annexes Y and 
P,”84 the Court’s judgment discusses these Annexes only sparsely. Similarly, while the 
International Whaling Commission passed a resolution, Resolution 2014-5 that “affirmed the 
authority of the Scientific Committee of the IWC to ‘review and comment on proposed special 
permits,’”85 it still limits the Scientific Committee to an advisory role. 
Limiting the influence of the Scientific Committee does not make sense. In the United 
States, agencies’ power to make rules is limited because of a concern that, without limits, parties 
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would not be properly noticed of the rules to which they would be subject.86 In International 
Whaling law, however, this concern cuts in the opposite direction. Because the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice prevents ICJ decisions from carrying precedential value,87 it is the 
Scientific Committee, not the International Court of Justice, that is able to provide notice and 
predictability to those seeking whaling permits.  
The International Whaling Commission seems to recognize this because it has instructed 
the Scientific Committee to “to revise how it reviews special-permit research programs” in light 
of the Australia v. Japan decision.88 Such a determination reflects a desire to give more 
permanence for a decision whose logic overall supported the goals of the International Whaling 
Commission. And the International Whaling Commission put a halt on the issuance of scientific 
whaling permits under existing research programs until, among other things, “the Scientific 
Committee has reviewed the research programme to enable it to provide advice to the 
Commission in accordance with the instructions above.”89 But as Matt DiCenso notes, this new 
Resolution does “little more than reaffirm a procedural framework that has proven to be 
ineffective in the past.”90 The same could be said of Resolution 2016-2, which notes that while 
the Commission will review the Scientific Committee’s finding, the International Whaling 
Commission will “form its own view.”91 The International Whaling Commission does not 
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indicate that weight that the recommendations of the Scientific Committee will be given in either 
Resolution,92 but only that it will “consider” these opinions.93 
Annex P, which dictates the review process for special permits, provides a detailed 
explanation of how whaling permits will be reviewed. The International Court of Justice 
acknowledges briefly that Annex P, and its predecessor, Annex Y, have dictated what goals are 
acceptable for whaling.94 The International Whaling Commission should indicate that no permits 
will be issued if the Scientific Committee finds that a research program is not being carried out 
for the purposes indicated in Annex P.95 
Furthermore, the International Whaling Commission should expand upon the guidelines 
given in Annex P and give them more teeth. For example, Specialist Workshops are tasked with 
reviewing how the research fits in with “relevant IWC resolutions and discussions”96 and “the 
utility of the lethal techniques used by the Special Permit Programme compared to non-lethal 
techniques.”97 The Scientific Committee should create a transparent methodology to evaluate 
important issues such as whether a program supports or contravenes IWC resolutions and 
whether lethal methods are used only when strictly necessary. Once the IWC and Scientific 
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Committee establish criteria, they should decide that the findings of the Scientific Committee are 
highly persuasive, if not binding. 
Placing greater weight on the findings of the Scientific Committee will force parties 
seeking permits to bring forward information about what the positive aspects of their program 
are. If the International Whaling Commission and the Scientific Committee are transparent about 
how they are making their determinations and provide a rubric for how determinations are made, 
then parties will have incentives both to do front-end research and to cooperate with scientists in 
other countries to get the best information. While the International Court of Justice did not focus 
on the duty to cooperate in Australia v. Japan,98 Judge Bhandari believed such duty to be 
“implicit.”99 Whether or not such a duty exists, any policy that gives incentives to collaborate 
and advance the best possible scientific research would serve the goals of the Convention and the 
International Whaling Commission. 
Mitigation 
Annex P hints at another potential that the International Whaling Commission could 
adopt. While it tasks Specialist Workshops with reviewing “the relationship of the research to 
relevant IWC resolutions and discussions,”100 it should require that permitting governments 
undertake mitigation measures in order to secure the populations of the whales they are 
researching. Just as in the case of agency deference, a look to NEPA is enlightening.  
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NEPA requires that government agencies prepare “a detailed discussion of possible 
mitigation measures,”101 but it does not require that agencies undertake these mitigation 
measures102 unless they are doing so to get out of writing a full Environmental Impact 
Statement.103 
Requiring parties to adopt mitigation measures would be consistent with Australia’s 
content that exceptions not be read so broadly as to “have the effect of undermining the 
effectiveness of the regulatory regime as a whole.”104 Judge Cançado Trindade, who wrote 
separately, noted however, that the Convention has a strong focus on conservation,105 as 
evidenced by the Preamble’s stated goal of “a system of international regulation . . . to ensure 
proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks.”106 Thus, even though the 
Convention writes that “the killing, taking, and treating of whales . . . shall be exempt from the 
operation of this Convention,”107 it does not make sense to allow the program as a whole to 
frustrate the expressed purposes of the Convention when alternatives area available. 
The idea of mitigation measures in a hunting program would not be unique. Namibia108 
and Zimbabwe,109 for example, permits to hunt endangered species are auctioned off, and the 
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108 See, e.g., “Can Trophy Hunting Actually Help Conservation?” University of Washington 
Conservation, (Jan. 15, 2014) http://www.conservationmagazine.org/2014/01/can-trophy-hunting-
reconciled-conservation/; “Does Trophy Hunting Actually Aid Conservation” The Atlantic (Sept. 8, 
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money raised is spent on conservation. Although the program is controversial, as might be 
expected, there is at least some evidence suggesting that it might be effective at promoting 
conservation. 110 There are some ways in which this program might serve as an effective model 
for the International Whaling Commission. One idea would be to require mitigation measures 
commensurate with the number of whales killed. In Australia v. Japan, the International Court of 
Justices did a deep dive into the specifics of Japan’s JARPA II program in order to determine 
“whether the design and implementation of a programme are reasonable in relation to achieving 
the stated research objectives.”111 One way to better ensure that permittees use lethal methods 
only when necessary is to require that they donate money or do some other mitigating behavior 
when they use lethal methods (i.e. when they kill whales). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
What the above-listed suggestions have in common is a concern that the ends justify the 
means. By analyzing Contracting Governments’ stated intentions closely, giving greater 
deference to the Scientific Committee, and requiring mitigation measures, the International 
Whaling Commission and the International Court of Justice can examine “the relationship of the 
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111 Australia v. Japan [2014], Court Judgment, 260 (International Court of Justice).  
research to relevant IWC resolutions and discussions”112 to see if the program promotes the goals 
of the International Whaling Commission or detracts from them. But, ideally, both the 
International Whaling Commission and the International Court of Justice would ask these 
questions as well. One could imagine the International Whaling Commission implementing 
something like President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, which determined that “regulatory 
action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society from the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs to society.”113 In the absence of such an order, increased scrutiny 
over purposes, deference to the Scientific Committee, and the requirement of mitigation 
measures should accomplish similar goals. 
The above suggestions are taken from American administrative and environmental law, 
but enforcing these would be consistent with existing whaling law. What makes arguing for legal 
changes difficult is the fact that the International Court of Justice’s opinions are not 
precedential.114 The actor in the best position to implement changes would therefore seem to be 
the International Whaling Commission itself. 
These suggested improvements, however, can be implemented without any changes to 
the Schedule or Annex P. In Australia v. Japan, Australia argued that Article VIII should be read 
consistently with the other provisions of the Convention.115 Its position is supported by the 
Vienna Convention, which established that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith . . . in 
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light of its object and purpose.”116 That scientific permits are meant to be read consistently with 
the rest of the Convention is made clear by the fact that Article VIII applies “notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Convention.”117 This demonstrates that permits granted under Article 
VIII should not be granted if the permit would mark an exception so great as to frustrate the 
goals of the Convention.  
More closely scrutinizing articulated purposes, giving greater weight to the Scientific 
Committee, and requiring mitigation measures are no more outside the Convention or Schedule’s 
text that the reasonableness test118 the International Court of Justice ended up imposing. The the 
International Court of Justice looked beyond the text, and this is made clear by the fact that the 
International Whaling Commission has since directed the Scientific Committee to incorporate 
the test.119 That the International Whaling Convention added the test shows that it was not there 
in the first place. 
At first glance, the reasonableness test advocated by the International Court of Justice 
would seem to accomplish the same goals as the measures proposed in this paper. But the 
International Court of Justice’s methodology of examining reasonableness does not accomplish 
the goals one might expect. The International Court of Justice’s focus on the “significant gap 
between the JARPA II target sample sizes and the actual number of whales that have been 
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killed”120 shows that it is more concerned with catching Japan in a lie than with asking the more 
fundamental question, namely whether Japan’s kill target was acceptable in the first place.  
While the International Court of Justice lacks the expertise to answer this question, the 
Scientific Committee does not. Making the weight of the Scientific Committee’s opinions more 
clear will help ensure that research program’s kill targets fit within the goals of the program. 
Requiring that Contracting Governments implement mitigations measures, meanwhile, will force 
them to scrutinize their kill target more target. 
Finally, greater scrutiny of the Contracting Government’s stated objectives not only 
accords with the Convention and Article 31 of the Vienna Convention but is also common sense. 
As Justice Scalia has noted, a government can usually come up with a purpose that seems, on its 
face, to be valid.121 Where the Contracting Government cannot even do this, as was the case for 
JARPA II,122 the International Court of Justice should not hesitate to invalidate the program.  
As Japan embarks on another “research” program, one which promises to kill even more 
whales, the International Whaling Commission and International Court of Justice (if it oversees a 
case) should more tightly scrutinize the motives and effects of Japan’s whaling program. 
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